Demonstration of Bayesian quantum game on an ion trap quantum computer by Solmeyer, Neal et al.
Demonstration of Bayesian quantum game on an ion trap quantum computer
Neal Solmeyer,1, ∗ Norbert M. Linke,2 Caroline Figgatt,2 Kevin A. Landsman,2
Radhakrishnan Balu,3, 4, † George Siopsis,5, ‡ and Christopher Monroe2, 6
1The MITRE Corporation 7596 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA, 22102-7539, USA.
2Joint Quantum Institute, Department of Physics,
and Joint Center for Quantum Information and Computer Science,
University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA.
3Computer and Information Sciences Directorate,
Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi, MD, 21005-5069, USA.
4Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland Baltimore County,
1000 Hilltop Circle, Baltimore, MD 21250, USA.§
5Department of Physics and Astronomy, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996-1200, USA.
6IonQ Inc., College Park, MD, 20740, USA.
(Dated: February 23, 2018)
We demonstrate a Bayesian quantum game on an ion trap quantum computer with five qubits.
The players share an entangled pair of qubits and perform rotations on their qubit as the strategy
choice. Two five-qubit circuits are sufficient to run all 16 possible strategy choice sets in a game with
four possible strategies. The data are then parsed into player types randomly in order to combine
them classically into a Bayesian framework. We exhaustively compute the possible strategies of the
game so that the experimental data can be used to solve for the Nash equilibria of the game directly.
Then we compare the payoff at the Nash equilibria and location of phase-change-like transitions
obtained from the experimental data to the theory, and study how it changes as a function of the
amount of entanglement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory, originally developed in the 1940s and
1950s [1–3], has since been the source of important con-
tributions in fields such as economics [4], political science
[5], biology [6], and computer science [7]. The addition
of quantum information concepts into games led to the
formalization of quantum games [8, 9]. Since their intro-
duction, quantum games have been studied in a variety of
contexts. With the growing prevalence of quantum com-
puters and quantum networks, quantum games emerge as
strong candidates for real world applications in quantum
security protocols [10], distributed quantum computing
algorithms [11], or improving the efficiency of classical
network routing algorithms [12].
In contrast with many interesting quantum computing
algorithms, quantum games can be demonstrated with
small numbers of qubits, making them an attractive ap-
plication for early demonstrations on quantum comput-
ers. There have been several experimental demonstra-
tions of quantum games using NMR quantum computers
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[13, 14] and various linear optical quantum computing
schemes [15–21]. In these demonstrations, the circuit
equivalent of the game was executed with the strategy
choices of the Nash equilibrium, as determined by the-
oretical analysis, and compared the expected payoff at
Nash equilibrium. This amounts to a type of benchmark-
ing of the performance of the quantum computer under
the framework of game theory.
One might argue that a true demonstration of a quan-
tum game would actually involve real players, either hu-
mans or computers, playing the game on true quantum
hardware. With real players playing on a classically
simulated quantum computer, people may actually play
quantum games more rationally than they play classical
games, even if they have no prior training in quantum
mechanics [22, 23]. This may be due to the fact that
people may have fewer preconceived notions about the
quantum strategies, and are thus more likely to simply
play for the highest payoff. Though this may have inter-
esting implications for potential real world applications
of quantum games, there is a gap between the potential
uses of quantum games and the availability of quantum
hardware.
This work aims to partially address that gap by per-
forming a more complete demonstration of a game on
a scalable quantum architecture that can be applied to
more complex game scenarios in the future. Ion trap
based systems are promising candidates for quantum
computers, which is a prerequisite for quantum games.
Further, ion-trap architectures are also promising for
quantum networking [24], where nodes are remotely lo-
cated and entangled, which may also be a requirement
for quantum game applications that require the players
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2to be remotely located.
We realize a game with incomplete information, i.e. a
Bayesian game [25]. The amount of incomplete informa-
tion is determined by a probability distribution of differ-
ent player types. Bayesian games are of interest because
of their deep connection to Bell’s inequalities [26]. The
Bayesian game we analyze is not directly derived from a
Bell’s inequality, but is rather a Bayesian game formed
by incorporating incomplete information classically into
a quantum game. The motivation behind this approach
is that incomplete information may often be a feature
of any potential application of quantum games, not just
games specifically designed to violate Bell’s inequalities,
and the interplay of classical probability and quantum
statistics can lead to a rich structure [27].
This is the first experimental demonstration of a quan-
tum game using a scalable architecture. Because of the
sophistication of current ion-trap quantum computers
compared to previously used quantum computers, a more
extensive implementation is possible. Using a novel par-
allelization scheme, we perform an exhaustive computa-
tion of all possible strategy choice combinations. This al-
lows us to solve for the Nash equilibria of the game based
only on the experimental outcomes. Therefore, we can
look not only at the payoff at Nash equilibria, but also
study where the equilibria occur and observe the effect
of experimental noise on the phase-change-like behavior
of quantum games. Such behavior occurs when one set
of equilibria changes to another as the entanglement or
amount of incomplete information is changed [28]. We
find that the deviation of the expected to measured pay-
off grows with the degree of entanglement in the game.
We also find that the deviation between the experimental
and theoretical location of the phase-change-like thresh-
olds grows with entanglement.
II. QUANTUM GAME IMPLEMENTATION
We experimentally demonstrate a Bayesian game that
displays several features worth exploring such as mul-
tiple simultaneous Nash equlibria and phase-change-like
behavior as functions of both the Bayesian probability
and the amount of entanglement. A detailed theoretical
analysis of this game can be found in ref. [27]. Being
composed of two player games, the demonstration is rel-
atively straightforward to implement experimentally, yet
has a rich enough structure to observe several features of
Bayesian games that are interesting from a game theo-
retical perspective.
First, we describe the two player game, which is used
to construct the Bayesian game, see Fig. 1. An entan-
gling gate is applied to two qubits, initialized in the state
|00〉, each qubit corresponding to one of two players. The
entangling operation is given by the general XX gate:
FIG. 1. Basic circuit of two player game. The qubits are
entangled J(χ), the players apply their strategy choices UA
and UB , the qubits are unentangled J
†(χ), and finally a mea-
surement is performed.
J(χ) =eiχX⊗X = cosχ+ iX ⊗X sinχ
=
 cosχ 0 0 −i sinχ0 cosχ −i sinχ 00 −i sinχ cosχ 0
−i sinχ 0 0 cosχ
 , (1)
where χ ∈ [0, pi/4]. After the entangling operation, the
players apply their strategy choices UA and UB . Finally
we will need the conjugate transpose of J(χ), (J(χ))† =
J(−χ). The final state for the two player game is given,
in the basis |A,B〉, by:
|ψf 〉 = J†(χ) · (UA ⊗ UB1) · J(χ) |00〉 . (2)
The payoff is then calculated based on the measure-
ments of the qubits. If the outcome of the measurement is
|0〉, this corresponds to one strategy choice in the classical
game (the analogue of cooperation (C) in the prisoner’s
dilemma), whereas if the outcome is |1〉, this corresponds
to the analogue of defection (D). The payoff for a given
strategy choice set is determined by the payoff matrix for
the game:
A|B1 |0〉 (C) |1〉 (D)
|0〉 (C) (11, 9) (1, 10)
|1〉 (D) (10, 1) (6, 6)
A|B2 |0〉 (C) |1〉 (D)
|0〉 (C) (11, 9) (1, 6)
|1〉 (D) (10, 1) (6, 0)
The two payoff matrices are for the games versus the
two different player types for player B. The rows and
columns represent the outcomes (which are the strategy
choices in classical games) of player A and B respectively,
and the numbers ($A, $B) are the payoffs for player A and
B.
The game between A and B1 is the standard prisoner’s
dilemma, while in the game between A and B2, player
B2 believes player A is the DA’s brother, which gives
player A an advantage resulting in an asymmetric payoff
between the players.
The payoff for player A is given by the expectation
value of the final state weighted by the elements of the
payoff matrix:
〈$A〉 =
∑
i
| 〈i|ψf 〉 |2$Ai , (3)
3where the sum is over all four possible measurement out-
comes of the two qubit system, and the $Ai are the cor-
responding elements of the payoff matrix.
A game is also defined by the allowable strategy
choices. We implement the game using four possible
strategy choices, compared to the most commonly used
set of three. The four-choice single player strategy set,
which we label U , is given by the three Pauli matrices
(X,Y , and Z) plus the identity (I). This choice of possi-
ble strategies bounds the results of a game with arbitrary
continuous strategy choices [29, 30].
The Bayesian game consists of two players A and B.
Player A is of one type, and player B can be one of
two types, B1 or B2. Player A plays with either B1 or
B2, with some probability p, which parametrizes the in-
complete information held by player A which is maximal
when p = 0.5, and minimal when p = 0 or 1. This game
uses three qubits, one for each player type, and proceeds
as follows. All three qubits are initialized to state |0〉.
The entangling operation J(χ) is performed between ei-
ther A and B1 or A and B2 probabilistically. Each player
chooses a strategy Ui from the set U and applies it to
their qubit. Then the appropriate unentangling opera-
tion J†(χ) is performed. Finally, the three qubits are
measured and the expected payoff for player A is given
by the weighted average of playing with B1 and B2:
〈$A〉 = 〈$A(A,B1)〉(p) + 〈$A(A,B2)〉(1− p) (4)
and the payoff for the B players is given by 〈$B1(A,B1)〉
and 〈$B2(A,B2)〉. There is structure in the game as the
amount of entanglement, χ, is varied, and as the proba-
bility to play with either player, p, is varied. We demon-
strate this by varying χ in the experiment, and varying p
in the analysis. To implement a Bayesian game between
players A, B1, and B2, we run many versions of the two
player circuit shown in Fig. 1, and then combine them
into a Bayesian game in the data analysis. This is sim-
ilar to what has been done to produce initial states for
quantum games which are a mixture of entangled states
that exhibit quantum discord [19].
The demonstration requires running 4 × 4 = 16 two-
qubit circuits for different strategy combinations, and to
make efficient use of the hardware available, we employ a
novel parallelization scheme. We compute the circuit for
multiple strategy choices simultaneously by using auxil-
iary qubits in superposition.
Two of the qubits must be assigned to the players,
while the three remaining qubits can be used to simulta-
neously run eight of the 16 strategy choice combinations.
The circuit for the parallel implementation is given in
Fig. 2. Starting with the three auxiliary qubits in the
state |000〉123, we apply a Hadamard gate H on each
of them. Together with the other 2 qubits, we form
|00 + ++〉AB123, where |+〉 = 1√2 (|0〉+ |1〉).
We perform J(χ) on qubits A and B, resulting in the
state
JAB(χ)|00 + ++〉AB123 (5)
We use the first auxiliary qubit as control to perform a
controlled-NOT (CNOT) gate on qubit A.
1√
2
1∑
x=0
XxAJAB(χ)|00x+ +〉AB123 (6)
We use the second auxiliary qubit as control to perform
a controlled-Z (C-Z) gate on qubit A.
1
2
1∑
x,y=0
ZyAX
x
AJAB(χ)|00xy+〉AB123 (7)
Then we use the third auxiliary qubit as control to per-
form C-Z on qubit B.
1
23/2
1∑
x,y,z=0
ZzBZ
y
AX
x
AJAB(χ)|00xyz〉AB123 (8)
Finally, we apply J(−χ) on qubits A and B, to obtain
1
23/2
1∑
x,y,z=0
JAB(−χ)ZzBZyAXxAJAB(χ)|00xyz〉AB123
(9)
and then measure all qubits. The final state contains
8 terms corresponding to different strategies, UA ∈
{I,X, Y, Z} and UB ∈ {I, Z}.
For the remaining strategies, we need to apply X on
qubit B before the final step. In this case, the final state
is
1
23/2
1∑
x,y,z=0
JAB(−χ)XBZzBZyAXxAJAB(χ)|00xyz〉AB123
(10)
Its terms correspond to the remaining eight strategies,
UA ∈ {I,X, Y, Z} and UB ∈ {X,Y }.
III. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The experimental setup constitutes a programmable
quantum computer. It consists of five 171Yb+ ions which
are trapped in a linear arrangement using a radiofre-
quency (RF) Paul trap, and laser cooled close to their
motional ground state. Two states in the 2S1/2 ground
level are used as the qubit states (|0〉 = |F = 0,mF = 0〉,
and |1〉 = |F = 1,mF = 0〉). They differ in energy by
the 12.642821 GHz hyperfine splitting which is insensi-
tive to the magnetic field to first order. This a so-called
“atomic clock” qubit has a typical coherence time of 0.5s
which can be further extended by suppressing magnetic
field noise. Optical pumping initializes the entire five-
qubit register, and read-out is performed collectively by
detecting state-dependent fluorescence [34].
Each ion is imaged onto its own channel of a multi-
channel photomultiplier tube (PMT) which allows its
state to be determined with 99.4(1)% average fidelity,
4FIG. 2. Circuit used for parallel implementation of two-
player quantum games. The top two qubits correspond to
the two players, and the bottom three qubits are auxillory
qubits used to run various strategy choices in parallel. The
two player qubits are entangled, J(χ) and a Hadamard is
applied to each of the auxiliary qubits. The CNOT and C-Z
gates followed by either an I or X gate, entangle the player
qubits with the auxiliary qubits so that all 16 strategy choice
combinations can be run with two 5-qubit circuits. Finally, an
unentangling gate is applied and a measurement is performed
on all qubits.
FIG. 3. Payoffs at Nash equilibrium for the Bayesian game
analyzed for p = 0.5. The outlined circles are the experimen-
tally determined payoffs while the circles are the theoretically
calculated values. There were no Nash equilibria found for
regions of the graph with no data, i.e. for χ = 0.05, or for
χ > 0.2. Note also that in the case of χ = 0.025 the ex-
perimental results computed a Nash equilibrium, while the
theoretical computation did not.
while the 5-qubit state detection is limited by channel-
to-channel crosstalk to 95.7(1)% average fidelity. For
averaged state probabilities, this state-preparation and
measurement (SPAM) error can be straightforwardly
renormalized by applying an independently determined
crosstalk-matrix. We drive qubit operations by applying
a pair of Raman beams that are configured to form beat
notes near the qubit frequency to the ions. Both beams
are derived from a single 355 nm mode-locked laser. One
beam is applied globally to the entire chain while the
second is split into a linear array of individual address-
ing beams, each of which is focused onto on a single ion
using a multi-channel acousto-optic modulator (AOM)
[32].
Single qubit gates (so-called R-gates) are applied by
driving resonant Rabi flopping on any individual ion with
the duration, phase and amplitude defined by the RF sig-
nals on the multi-channel AOM. We achieve two-qubit
gates (so-called XX-gates) by applying bichromatic Ra-
man beat notes near the motional sideband frequencies.
They create an effective XX-Ising interaction between the
spin degrees of freedom containing the qubit mediated by
all of the collective motional modes in the ion chain [35–
37]. In order to leave spin and motion disentangled at the
end of the operation, we employ a pulse-shaping scheme
during the gates [38, 39].
Any pair of qubits can be entangled in this way, which
makes this a fully-connected system of qubits [33]. A
classical compiler breaks down a library of computational
gates, such as Hadamard, controlled-NOT, or controlled-
Phase, into the native R- and XX-operations. Since any
context-dependence (such as calibration parameters) of
the native operations is handled by the compiler, the
high-level gates become modular. Arbitrary circuits can
then be implemented from a user interface by specifying
a sequence of computational and/or native gates which
makes the system programmable. Native single- and two-
qubit gate fidelities are typically 99.5(2)% and 98.5(5)%,
respectively. Gate times are about 10 µs for single- and
210 µs for two-qubit gates.
IV. RESULTS
We perform the simulation for nine values of χ be-
tween zero and maximal in steps of pi40 . The nominal
values of χ were, in units of pi: (0, 0.025, 0.05, 0.075,
0.1, 0.125, 0.15, 0.175, 0.2, 0.225, 0.25). For each of
the two five-qubit cirucits depicted in Fig. 1, we have
∼ 30,000 runs. Before and after each data run (except
for χ = (0, 0.125, 0.25)), a run was taken to measure the
value of χ to take any deviation from the nominal values
into account. Such deviations are the result of calibration
inaccuracy in the experiment. The average of the mea-
sured χs are used for the analysis and were found to be:
(0, 0.027(2), 0.054(3), 0.080(4), 0.108(4), 0.125, 0.151(5),
0.178(5), 0.201(5), 0.224(6), 0.25). For each experimental
run, the quantum computer outputs the measured value
(i.e. either |0〉 or |1〉) for all five qubits.
The data are parsed into two groups representing
games of A vs. B1 and A vs. B2 respectively. The value
of p, which determines the probability that player A plays
with either B1 or B2, is chosen for a given analysis, and
each data point is sorted randomly into the two cate-
gories with probability p. Next, the expectation value of
all 32 possible outcomes is computed to form the output
population vector for the two data sets. SPAM correc-
tion is then applied to the population vector to correct
for readout errors.
Next, in order to compute the payoff, Eq. (4), for the
5players for a given set of strategy choices, we must de-
termine the outcomes of the qubits for player A and B
depending on the 8 possible outcomes for the three aux-
iliary qubits. For example, if the ’I’ circuit in Fig. 2 out-
puts |000〉 for the three auxiliary qubits, this corresponds
to players A and B having applied the strategies {I, I}.
The components with the auxiliary output of |000〉 are
summed to form the 4-component vector representing the
expectation values of the A and B qubits for each of the 8
auxiliary output combinations. These population vectors
are each then re-normalized and the experimental payoff
is computed with Eq. (3). This is done for both the I-
circuit and the X-circuit of Fig. 2 in order to compute
the experimental payoff for all 16 possible strategy choice
combinations of the two-player payoff matrix. The data
for both types of player B receive the same treatment.
From the two 4× 4 two-player payoff matrices, we can
compute the 64 element 4 × 4 × 4 payoff matrix of the
Bayesian game according to Eq. (4). The same data are
analyzed for p values ranging from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.01
in order to observe the structure of the game as a function
of the incomplete information.
In order to compute the Nash equilibria, the best re-
sponse curves must be constructed. The best response
curve for player A is given by the list βA = {i∗, j, k},
where j and k run over all of the possible strategy choices
of B1 and B2, and i
∗ is the strategy choice that gives A
the highest payoff for the choices of j and k for play-
ers B1 and B2. The best response curves for the B
players are similarly calculated, βB1 = {i, j∗, k}, and
βB2 = {i, j, k∗}. The Nash equilibria are given by the
intersection of the best response curves, βA ∪ βB1 ∪ βB2.
In other words, any strategy choice combination where
each player is playing their best response to the other
player’s choices is a Nash equilibrium. In general, this
can result in one or more Nash equilibria or none.
For the computation of the best response curves from
the experimental data, we consider a payoff to be the best
response if it is within an amount δ of the maximum. If
this is not included, the best response for each player
will only be one particular strategy choice set, that will
be determined by the experimental noise, and we almost
never get a Nash equilibrium. The data presented use
δ = 0.1.
We plot the payoffs of the three players, as a function
of the entanglement χ, both theoretically and experimen-
tally, for the nine different values of entanglement in Fig.
3. These data are analyzed for the case where p = 0.5.
The error in the horizontal represents the error in entan-
glement calibration data taken before and after each set
of data. The error in the payoff is the statistical error
determined by the error in a binomial distribution of ion
populations assuming that, on average, there were 3000
shots contributing to each point, with ∼ 300 of them in
|1〉, which was found to be the case for the dominant
equilibria.
The data show that for no entanglement, χ = 0, the ex-
perimental data very closely match the theoretical data.
FIG. 4. The RMSD of the payoff at the maximal payoff Nash
equilibria when the Bayesian game is analyzed with p = 0
(i.e., player A exclusively plays with player B2), is plotted as
a function of entanglement.
With growing χ there is a systematic shift by which the
experimental results fall predominantly below the theory
values, probably a result of the growing error introduced
by the gate. However this effect is smaller than our esti-
mated statistical error. The theoretical and experimental
data have no Nash equilibrium above a critical value of
entanglement, χ ∼ 0.175pi. Note also that the exper-
imental data for χ = 0.025pi show a Nash equilibrium
even though none is predicted theoretically. This is in-
dicative of the fact that experimental errors can alter the
critical values of the phase-change-like behavior.
The addition of experimental noise to quantum games
is known to not affect the existence of a Nash equilib-
rium, but it tends to lower the payoff at Nash equilibria
[31]. This is due to the fact that the quantum games
that are chosen for demonstrations are those in which
the payoff at Nash equilibrium is larger than the payoff
for other strategy choices. This is also the case for our
implementation, see Fig. 3.
To characterize the size of the systematic shift of the
expected payoff for theory vs. experiment, we plot the
root-mean-square deviation (RMSD) of the experimen-
tal data to the theoretical calculation as a function of
entanglement.The results are plotted in Fig. 4. For con-
sistency, the data is analyzed for p = 0, instead of p = 0.5
because at p = 0 there is Nash equilibrium that is com-
mon to all values of entanglement, and has the theoretical
payoffs for players (A,B1, B2) equal to (11, 10, 9) with the
strategy choices of the three players given by {I,X, I} as
well as {Z, Y, Z}. The trend is that the deviation from
the theoretically calculated payoff grows as entanglement
increases. Notably, for large values of entanglement, the
shift is larger in the case of p = 0 than it is for the case
of p = 0.5 plotted in Fig. 3. This is because there is a
larger deviation in the game of A vs. B2 than there is
in the game of A vs. B1, which stems from the differ-
ences in the particular gates applied by the players in the
equilibria in different regions of the Bayesian game.
In addition, we can see from the data how the phase-
6change like behavior of the Nash equilibria change with
experimental noise. Our step size of χ = pi/40 does not
permit a detailed study of the threshold for phase-like
behavior as the entanglement is varied. But, because we
incorporate the probability in the analysis, we can see
the change in the threshold probability with fine steps
allowing a systematic study of the threshold probability
at which the equilibria change. In the top part of Fig. 5
we plot the data for one example value of entanglement,
pi/20, as a function of p both theoretically and experi-
mentally as a black line and red triangles, respectively.
First, there are two phase transitions, one near p =
0.16 and the other near p = 0.55. It can be seen that the
critical value of p for the phase transition is different from
theory and experiment. If we increase the value of the
best-response thresholding parameter δ, the experimen-
tal Nash equilibria will extend further in either direction,
also, additional equilibria may arise.
In the region of the equilibrium between p = 0.6 and
p = 1, another feature of note occurs. The main equi-
librium in this region is given by {X,Y, Z}. Though for
p between 0.81 and 1, a second Nash equilibrium ap-
pears. This equilibrium is given by {Y,X, I} and has a
slightly lower payoff. The presence of this equilibrium
is due to the finite δ parameter in the analysis of the
best response. If δ were smaller, the region of the second
equilibria would shrink, but so would the region with the
real equilibrium. For this, and other similar observed sec-
ondary equiliria, the transition is usually blurred, mean-
ing the second equilibrium can appear and vanish several
times with increasing p before it is reliably present.
We analyze the data for each value of entanglement
for all values of p in order to see how the deviation of
the threshold p changes as the entanglement grows. For
consistency, we analyze the location of the phase tran-
sition near p = 0.16. Theoretically this phase change
occurs at p = 0.16 for all values of entanglement. The
deviation of the theoretical to experimental threshold p
also grows slightly with the entanglement as seen in the
bottom of Fig. 5. For the values of χ > .175pi, another
equilibrium appeared in the analysis (not shown in any
graph) with the strategy choices of {X,Z, Y }. This equi-
librium closely resembles the main one in this region with
strategy choices {I,X, I} and {Z, Y, Z} with nearly the
same payoffs. However, this equilibrium has a threshold
p which is slightly larger, p ∼ 0.29. As χ increases, the
payoffs, and threshold p of this equilibrium converge to
the main equilibrium.
V. DISCUSSION
Deviations in the payoff for the experimentally deter-
mined equilibria are expected due to the finite fidelity
of the circuit, Fig. 2. If there is an error in one of the
player qubits, the experimentally determined payoff will
be incorrect, while if there is an error in one of the aux-
iliary qubits, the outputs for the player qubits in that
FIG. 5. Top: example of an analysis with varying p for
χ = pi/20. There is a region in the center where the equi-
librium disappears, and a region for high p where a second
equilibrium appears. Bottom: The deviation of the exper-
imentally determined threshold p as a function of entangle-
ment.
run will be misidentified. In either case this results in a
different output than that predicted by the circuit. Be-
cause the game implemented is one where the payoffs at
the equilibria are typically some of the higher payoffs in
the game, deviation from the theoretical behavior will
typically result in a lower payoff. If a game were chosen
where the equilibrium was not the highest payoff in the
game, i.e. if it were not Pareto optimal, then deviation
from the theoretical payoff at equilibrium would tend to
increase the payoff, which we see if we change the payoff
matrices for the analysis in our game. Because the gate
errors tend to be larger for larger values of entanglement,
the deviation from theoretical behavior increases with χ.
When the experimentally determined payoff deviates
significantly from the theoretical value, this can result in
the disappearance or appearance of Nash equilibria. This
is seen both at the boundaries between regions with dif-
ferent equilibria and in the appearance of new equilibria
as in the bottom and top of Fig. 5. These transitions can
be blurred, so that they are not as precisely defined as
they are theoretically. This could have impact in the ap-
plications of quantum games such as mechanism design
where the game is structured in order to steer the players
towards certain Nash equilibria, so that the play is self-
7reinforcing and thus stable. If the experimental errors
remove some expected equilibrium, the players would not
converge their play on the strategies of the equilibrium
as expected and the game could become unstable.
When an alternate competing equlibrium appears,
such as in the top of Fig. 5, the players could become
stuck on the ‘wrong’ equilibrium. If the game dynami-
cally changes, for instance, if p changes, the players may
continue to follow the lower payoff equilibrium.
We have performed what we believe is a unique demon-
stration of a quantum game for several reasons. It is
the first experimental demonstration performed on an
ion-trap-based quantum computer, and we employ a
novel parallelization scheme. The sophistication of the
ion-trap quantum computer has enabled a much more
extensive demonstration that has allowed us to gener-
ate enough data to demonstrate a more complicated
Bayesian game than the more commonly demonstrated
two player games. This is also the first time the ex-
perimental data have been solely used to solve for the
Nash equilibria of the game, which allowed us to exper-
imentally observe the behavior of the payoff as well as
phase-change-like behavior as the amount of entangle-
ment changes. We are also the first to show explicitly
how the deviation of the theory to experiment varies as
a function of the entanglement.
The value of entanglement is interpreted as being set
by a referee of the game. In the case of four allowed strat-
egy choices, maximal entanglement is not always desired
from the point of view of an optimal equilibrium. In fact,
the behavior of the game becomes less predictable for
larger entanglement because of the increased gate errors.
These considerations would have to come into any design
of a game or choices by a referee in order to promote the
desired behavior.
Advances in ion-trap quantum computers underscore
the reason that they are a promising platform for quan-
tum games in particular. In addition, ion-trap-based
quantum computers are a promising candidate for quan-
tum networking, which is crucial for some quantum game
applications that require the agents to be remotely lo-
cated in order to be useful. The potentially long coher-
ence time of trapped ions would also enable the quantum
hardware to interact with other systems, such as humans,
classical computers, sensors, etc., as may be required for
quantum game applications.
Quantum games may play an important role in the ap-
plications of quantum computers and quantum networks
as they begin to become more available. We believe this
demonstration brings us one step closer to that reality.
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